and Latin America. I.G. Farben was leading internationally in know-how and patents concerning the chemical sector. As such it had become attractive for the Cárdenas government for participating in the creation of a nationally-controlled Mexican chemical industry. In addition, I.G. Farben was able to supply vital chemical products for Cárdenas' economic projects: chemicals for the existing industry, dyes for the textile sector, pharmaceuticals and medical expertise for the public health system and military hospitals, fertilizers for the agricultural sector and paint and varnishes for the new infrastructure. Last but not least, Mexican cooperation with the German I.G. Farben would limit Mexico's dependence on the U.S. and continue to diversify her trade relations in the direction of Europe. As we will see, this German-Mexican cooperation began with much hope, but soon led to frustration and finally to the takeover of I.G. property and know-how in Mexico by the Ávila Camacho government after the publication of the U.S. Proclaimed Lists in 1941.
This process has never received any systematic analysis or public attention. However, its importance extends beyond the bilateral German-Mexican realm. Although its resolution occurred within the struggle between Allies and Axis countries, it should not be mistaken as a part of the ideological battle between fascism and democracy. Rather, it represents the successful quest by a developing country for breaking the dominance over technical know-how by the representative of the industrialized nations in a post-imperialist environment. When Mexico gained control over petroleum, significant state of the art know-how and patents concerning the manufacturing of petroleum products from high octane gasoline for cars to the advanced application of nitrogen. As a result, it multiplied the value of Mexico's raw materials and accelerated her move away from an exclusively primary material exporting country. Without I.G!s know-how Mexico's industrialization in the 1940's would have proceeded differently.
From a first world perspective the story answers significant questions about the development of multinationals, a debate that has usually been placed in the 1950's. The central question is what made a world exporter turn multinational; did it originate as company policy or was it rather a reaction to international processes? In the case of I.G. Farben of predominant importance is the question: why did its plans turn sour? Why was the developing country successful in confiscating its property; was it plan or accident?
Finally a word of caution. When we talk of the struggle between developing countries and multinationals in the 1930's, we analyze an emerging debate, not the well-developed conflict of the post Second World War era. Not that the developing Mexico had never before wrestled with multinational companies -the Mexican government's fight against British and U.S. oil companies since the beginning of the 20th century are a prime example -but multinationalization in the case of I.G. Farben meant the relocation of production and manufacturing facilities outside the national boundaries of the mother country. While the struggle with the oil companies was over control and exploitation over raw materials, I.G. Farben's struggle is about control over the inner sanctum of multinational companies: her production knowledge and facilities. And here the circles closes.
Namely, the I.G. Farben case is not an isolated issue, but rather a prototype of future conflicts in the 1940's and 1950's. While the issue is of general significance for the 1930's, the outcome certainly can only be understood within the history of the Second World War. As we will see, because the Cárdenas and the Ávila Camacho governments realized the international dimension of the case, they managed to use a conflict between multinationals and developing countries. For once Mexico had benefitted from international developments.
II I.G. FARBEN'S OUTREACH TO LATIN AMERICA
In the 1930's a chemical industry in Mexico was almost non-existent. Controlled by cartel arrangements, almost all chemical products were imported by either U.S. and British or German chemical concerns 1 . Contrary to their dominance in the Mexican petroleum and mining sector, U.S. and British companies had never achieved total control over Mexico's chemical market. The German chemical concern I.G. Farben controlled the pharmaceutical sector and thus the medical supply of Mexico's public health sector, the dye sector, which was crucial to Mexico's textile industry and finally the nitrogen production used mainly for fertilizers and vital to the agrarian program of the Cárdenas era. Only in the sector of heavy chemicals were U.S., British and French companies leading. These chemicals were used mainly in the U.S. and British owned mining industries in Mexico. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the U.S. Commerce Department classified Germany as the dominating force in the industrial chemical market in Latin America 2 . Within Latin America, Mexico was a special case. Since the Calles government, Mexico's political process had concentrated the country's economic power in the hand of the government. This trend reached its peak in 1936 when all state contracts were put under the exclusive control of the Mexican economic ministry. What was even more important was Mexico's nationalist economic policy which sought to achieve independent industrialization.
Within this context, I.G. Farben started a new overture towards Latin America in 1936. Just as in Mexico where economic power had been centralized, the Third Reich economic policy had put I.G. Farben under domestic constraints that encouraged the search for new export markets via barter deals. As a consequence of the economic "New Plan" in 1934 I.G. Farben's exports to Latin America had increased significantly, trading Latin American raw materials for German manufactured goods and at the same time saving scarce foreign exchange for the Third Reich economy. Within this context I.G. Farben had been able to gain control over the greatest segment of German exports to Mexico. First, it had pushed its domestic competitor BAMAG out of the construction business of chemical plants. Claiming As in the case of Mexico, nationalist economic objectives had interfered in the struggle among international cartel members. As a result, the rules of the game were about to be changed and I.G. Farben's future control over her market share would be challenged not only by international competition but by Mexico's quest for national technology and know-how in the chemical sector. This problem is mirrored in reports of I.G. Farben's board member Dr. Max Ilgner's trip to Latin America. Accompanied by Dr. Ahlgrimm, one of the leaders of the nitrogen Syndikat, Ilgner's trip had four objectives: 1. inspection of the existing I.G. Farben facilities, 2. examination of the individual countries in view of increased German participation in their industrial development, 3. discussion of increased export possibilities 4. and to push Latin American countries to join the international chamber of commerce 6 .
Point number two was most important since it pointed at the risk and the potential of developmental economic nationalism for the German concern. I.G. Farben was challenged by the development process. In his report, ligner stated I.G. Farben's attitude towards industrialization:
". . . certainly from the point of view of the highly industrialized countries such an engagement in the industrialization process has to be a means to an end, not an end in itself. Only where, because of reasonable motives such a development cannot be stopped, one should get involved. And this only so far as is necessary, on the one hand to fortify one's own position of export, and on the other hand in order to secure a respective share of the future increase in purchasing power for additional export... Also here the basic idea must remain: the expansion of one own's business 7 .
ILL IN MEXICO
After their arrival in Mexico, ligner and Ahlgrimm attended a busy conference with Mexican state and government officials. On the top of the agenda was a proposed nitrogen plant that the government wanted to build inside Mexico. In general, I.G. Farben had disliked the construction of a nitrogen project in Mexico, since it would compete with German nitrogen exports to Mexico. During the initial meeting, ligner and Ahlgrimm tried to discourage the Mexican government's nitrogen project. Against the technical adviser of the Mexican Secretaría de Economía, ligner and Ahlgrimm argued that the construction of the plant would raise significantly the cost of nitrogen compared to cheaper German exports. The same would be true for possible Mexican ideas of exporting nitrogen to other Latin American countries. Unimpressed by the arguments, the Mexican officials continued to push for the construction of the plant.
The course of the discussions changed rapidly when ligner and Ahlgrimm learned that French and U.S. companies had already handed in written estimates for the same project. Suddenly, they appeared to see the project in a more positive light. Immediately after the meeting ligner requested a speedy, written estimate from Germany. Furthermore, he requested a nitrogen specialist to travel to Mexico in order to assist in a later closing of the deal. Later in his report to Berlin, a frustrated German commercial attache remarked that at least this way the project would not fall into the hands of foreign competition.
These oberservations underline the unease of the I.G. officials about Mexican industrialization in the chemical sector. But the Mexicans had forced the law of action on the I.G. Farben. Next, ligner met with the presidents of the Bank of Mexico, the Union of Mexican banks, the national Chamber of Commerce, and the director general of the Mexican Bank. During these meetings Ilgner's basic pitch was one of an advocate of Mexican industrialization. He hoped that it would increase the Latin American standard of living as well as purchasing power. As a result, developed nations could expect a growth of their export market in Latin America. ligner forecasted that in the case of a fivefold increase in Latin America's and Mexico's industrial output, Latin America's imports from Germany would double. True to Mexican nationalistic economic spirit ligner agreed with his Mexican colleagues that a company in Mexico could never again be 100% in the hand of foreigners. Rather, future industrial projects should be realized with the help of joint ventures that should be controlled 60% by Mexican and 40% by foreign capital. ligner saw mainly Germans as owners of some of the projects, but conceded that if Mexico preferred, the German industry would engage in joint ventures with British or U.S. capital.
Personally, ligner spoke against 100% German company ownership in Mexico. He not only wanted to spread the risk of investment, but at the same time he desired to foster the creation of a larger number of Mexican industries and thus increase Mexican purchasing power. Therefore, ligner suggested 20% German participation in 5 different companies. After this general tour d'horizon the topic of discussion became the raising of investment capital and the management of joint ventures. ligner hoped that two thirds of the 60% Mexican-owned share would be raised by Mexican private industry. The other third should be raised on the public market, "out of practical reasons". While this seemed to leave control in Mexican hands, it also allowed any naturalized German immigrant, or a bank controlled by foreigners to buy the last one third on the public market and unite it with the 40% foreign ownership. Thus through the backdoor, foreign industrial interests could gain the majoritiy on the board and control over the property! This was nothing else but a diversion of the course of Mexican industrialization.
In regard to company leadership, ligner demanded foreign management for the first ten years since these new industries were unknown to Mexicans. This was supposed to be solidified by a composition of 50/50 percent of the voting pool in contrast to the 60/40 percent composition of ownership. Finally, only in the case of the joint venture's success, in the first 10 years, the national majority would gain the opportunity to vote for national management and a 60/40 percent voting pool. But ligner was convinced that even in the case of success, the stockholders would vote for the continuation of foreign leadership. In the case that the first ten years had not been successful, ligner demanded that foreign leadership and 50/50 voting pool would continue for another five years 8 ! Clearly these outlines show that since I.G. Farben could not stop Mexico's national policy it participated in it not only to maintain its market shares, but to divert Mexico's thrust of industrialization.
But the story would not be complete without an attempt by ligner to spread the risk of I.G.'s suggested strategy. Before ligner left Mexico, he conferred with other private foreign economic leaders in Mexico like the directors of the U.S.-owned Standard Oil, National City Bank and the British Shell subsidiary. The U.S. embassy and the British minister to Mexico were also visited. In the meeting with the representatives of Standard Oil, Shell and City Bank, ligner changed the tune of the song and portrayed the Mexican nationalist economic strategy as a threat to foreign property. Pointing at the possible threat of expropriation, ligner appealed to the common interests of foreign capital in Mexico. But in reality this appeal was predominantly in the interest of the I.G. Farben concern, since it would be its patents, licenses and know-how that would be expropriated. Unfortunately the sources do not reveal more about the actual scope of international cooperation concerning the chemical sector in Mexico.
These observations show that ligner, as representative of the I.G., clearly realized the potential of Mexico's nationalistic policies. They show the vulnerability of an exporter who had to relocate his production facilities due to international competition and nationalistic policies of a developing country. Their potential was supposed to be broken via structural constraints and the set up of international joint ventures that would increase the risk for Mexico to expropriate. Regardless of the outcome, ligner had decided that I.G. Farben should become engaged in Mexico. In the future, it planned not only to export goods but also to export production facilities. Since indirectly these factories could be controlled by German ownership and management, this trip constituted a significant step towards multinational operation.
One point on Ilgner's agenda has not been mentioned at all. It was the establishment of a company-owned and company-controlled information service, operating as intelligence back-up within the context of I.G.'s overseas expansion 9 . The Mexico branch was put under the control of a special liaison person, Baron von Humboldt who had to report on Mexican economic and political developments directly to the intelligence headquarter in Berlin called NW 7. The head of the I.G. Farben subsidiary in Mexico received orders to cooperate closely with him. Due to NW 7's extremely close cooperation with the German Armed Forces during the Second World War, this has been interpreted mainly as a simple fascist espionage organization. Also, Hayes misses NW 7's significance by reducing it to being Ilgner's personal agency. Although it soon performed work that went beyond company objectives, it would be too simplistic to see it only as part of the German intelligence network, as Ilgner's personal toy. Rather, it symbolizes the creation of an international I.G. Farben communications network outside the traditional diplomatic report system. As part of the new international economic order, multinational-turning trusts established their own system of intelligence and forecasting, creating competition to the traditional state institutions of ambassadors and commercial attaches.
Since the multinational was about to go beyond national borders and, in the case of conflict try to separate itself from national political constraints, it could no longer depend exclusively on national organizations. The potential of I.G. Farben's alternative information structure was demonstrated during the Second World War when it provided I.G. Farben with a sophisticated channel of communication that reported from Latin America after the break-off of diplomatic relations. Today, multinational companies continue to maintain their own forecasting departments and intelligence division which produce sophisticated country risk analysis for current operations and future investments 10 .
IV ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND I.G. FARBEN'S FRUSTRATION
Only a few weeks after Ilgner's departure from Mexico, Mexican president Cárdenas invited the German commercial attache in Mexico, Burandt to an informal discussion of German -Mexican economic matters. During the conversation Cárdenas informed Burandt of his decision to give I.G. Had I.G. Farben's business hopes for the Mexican market only been an illusion? What had happened that caused the failure of I.G.'s expansion in the construction business in Mexico; was it due to international competition, Third Reich policy or Mexican domestic events? As we will see, the sources suggest that Mexico's nationalist economic policy continued to be a major obstacle and blocked the realization of planned projects.
Soon after Cárdenas had given the bid to I.G. Farben, the Mexican government began to modify the plans. It inquired about alternative plants and requested basic changes in size and mode of the nitrogen plant at the cost of I.G. Farben 13 .1.G. Farben's designers became frustrated. At the same time other Latin American countries gave construction bids to the I.G. Farben. Their national economic policies were less radical and offered a more secure business environment. It is no surprise that I.G. Farben's priority shifted to these projects. While sources still mention a planned Mexican nitrogen plant in 1938, no I.G. Farben involvement in its construction was mentioned I4 .
In late 1937 and early 1938 Cárdenas' policy led to the nationalization of the foreign oil companies. This not only put foreign projects in Mexico on hold but also changed the economic priorities of the Mexican government 15 . Now it had to maintain and manage a huge industrial complex that demanded the availability of all national resources. In addition it was interested in acquiring patents and technical know-how which it could apply in the nationalized industry for her national objectives.
I.G. and patents as early as from 1938 on. One document is a confidential memo to the Mexican Foreign Minister asking for the exclusion of the Beick Company from confiscation by the Black Lists. The petition talks about the negative effects that the intervention of numerous governmental custodians would have on the company and national interest. As a result it demands the withdrawal of the Beick company from the Black Lists.
While this memo was submitted after the publication of the U.S. Proclaimed Lists in 1941, the memo was written already in July of 1938, shortly after the oil expropriation 17 ! If we assume that the date is no typoand numerous archivists in the Mexican Foreign Ministry have reassured me that it is no typo -then we could assume that the Mexican government had been working on the establishment of her Black Lists at least since 1938. Thus effect and opportunities resulting out of the Black Lists for Mexico's industrialization -Mexico's access and control over first world know-how -had been a point of discussion in the Mexican government one year before the outbreak of the Second World War. Already at this time, the idea seemed to have been contemplated that the Mexican government should add this vital industrial complex to her national industry. From that point of view the publication of the Black Lists in 1941 marked the go ahead of a policy that had been developed much earlier.
I.G. Farben itself had learned about this possibility in the summer of 1939. At this time the Mexican government was planning to construct a refinery for airplane fuel 18 . Already before, the Mexican government had send memos to her embassies and advised her consuls to inquire about patents for high octane gas 19 . From Hamburg/Germany Mexican Consul Sierra had reported back to Mexico City that I.G. Farben was holding upto-date patents on this process. When PEMEX approached I.G. Farben, the German concern offered to Mexico the know-how under the condition that PEMEX would sign a license agreement which would bind it to I.G. know-how, expertise, chemical agents etc. 20 PEMEX declined the offer. This treat confirms other indications that German chemical property in Mexico was in jeopardy long before the publication of the Black Lists. I.G. Farben had come between a rock and a hard place. On the one side it was threatened to loose its market share to international competition, on the other side it were Mexico's nationalistic economic objectives that challenged property and know-how. This was a painful way to learn the limits of multinationals in a nationalistic environment. Only two years later Dr. Friedmann's threat became reality when the Ávila Camacho government enacted the U.S. Proclaimed Lists and the entire I.G. property and know-how came under its control. Immediately the Mexican government cleaned the property from undesired Axis personal and removed the entire chemical complex off the Black Lists. Against different expectations of the U.S. industry and government, a Mexican board managed the I.G. subsidiaries, kept its property intact and incorporated it into Mexico's industrial structure 23 .
V TOWARDS MULTINATIONALIZATION
While I.G.'s efforts to participate in the construction sector with Mexican governmental projects had been frustrated, its export business I.G. Farben's export network had been reorganized after the First World War. During the war, the property of the German chemical companies in the United States and Latin America had been confiscated, which had resulted in a loss of its patents and know-how. It took I.G. Farben until the end of the 1920's to regain its dominant position over Latin American markets 25 . In order to avoid a repetition of this experience, I.G. Farben established Latin American subsidiaries under the ownership of German individuals who had obtained the nationality of the respective host country. This way "enemy ownership" would be much more difficult in a coming war.
This new structure of "national" ownership proved to be the best weapon against the rising economic nationalism. In order to gain more revenue for national projects, developing countries had imposed increasing taxes on the foreign companies. However, since I.G. subsidiaries were registered under the name of a naturalized Mexican they did not have to pay higher head taxes. In addition, under certain circumstances they could avoid publishing a profit and loss statement, were protected against boycott and at the same time enabled the I.G. Farben to circumvent foreign currency regulations 26 . These currency savings translated into an agressive pricing policy, as described by the head of I.G. Farben's subsidiary in the United States von Schnitzler: On top of this legal structure, I.G. Farben had established an outstanding network with service representatives who often came out of the German community. From a customer's perspective it was the quality of this sales network that made it beneficial to use I.G. Farben products. Von Schnitzler put it into perspective: ". . . good and cautious technical advice in the application of our products is of decisive importance for the development of our business. We may even say that in certain fields, the superiority over our competitors from other countries is based not only on the higher quality of our products, but above all on the well organized and excellent trained sales staff and on the technical service to the customers" 28 .
Sources indicate that nationwide in Mexico about 260 pharmacies distributed especially I.G. products 29 . This excellent organization and marketing helped I.G. Farben to solidify its dominating position in Latin America and Mexico. The outbreak of the Second World War confronted I.G. Farben's Latin American subsidiaries with the same problem it had encountered twenty-five years before: would the Allies be able to take over the German enemy property? Half a year after the outbreak of the war von Schnitzler reported to Rudolf Hess that the camouflage measures were working and in numerous cases had exceeded his expectations 30 .
While I.G. Farben's immediate threat to its property seemed to have been banned, the outbreak of the war had changed a crucial part of its operation: its supply of goods and merchandize. The British blockade had cut off the Latin American main supply line from Germany and regular supplies to Latin American subsidiaries seemed to be very questionable in the future. But to the surprise of many observers this was not the case. How did the network continue to operate until the Mexican confiscation without supplies from Germany? The basic answer is by relocating production in a multinational fashion into countries that were not affected by the British blockade, in this case the U.S. Thus the outbreak of the Second World War forced I.G. Farben to multinationalize its export production, management and distribution. The basic idea of this strategy was that a U.S. manufacturer under I.G. Farben control could provide supplies just as well as factories in Germany. In the U.S. the main supplier for Latin America became Bayer of New York and the Sydney Ross companies in Mexico. They acquired raw materials and manufactured them on the U.S. market and then shipped them to companies like Felix Beick in Mexico. There they were repackaged and sold through the still existing I.G. Farben distribution system. Additional measures supported the plan. Already before the war the subsidiaries had put aside cash reserves without showing them in the official books. In Mexico it provided I.G. Farben's organization with additional 200.000 German Reichsmarks that were used for the purchase of medical products on the U.S. market. This helped balance out supply shortages during the initial time of transition in 1939 and 1940. In addition, low merchandise stocks in Latin American warehouses not only stabilized but also minimized potential losses in the case of Allied confiscation.
Overall, I.G. Farben's customer loyalty generated sufficient profitable demand for I.G.'s U.S. facilities. I.G. Farben's multinational transition from production in the motherland to production abroad worked well. In 1940 von Schnitzler in the U.S. reported to Berlin: ". . .at the present time the supplies from the USA are coming in the desired quantity" 31 .
But not all supplies came from the United States. Until the outbreak of the Russian-German conflict, transports used the Sibirian -Japanese route. Since I.G. Farben also had a wide sales network in the Far Eastern area it could afford to send ships via the Indian Ocean and the Pacific to Latin America. If war activities in the Pacific Ocean would keep German ships from reaching Latin America the goods could be sold on the Far Eastern market. A third way was the use of blockade runners out of neutral ports in Italy and the Netherlands. Also, Axis airlines shipped small parcels for Latin American distribution to South America.
Finally, small production and research plants that the I.G. had built for itself contributed to keep the flow of goods running. In 1940 the head of the Latin American department remarked about the facilities in Mexico and Argentina: "We are doing considerable business, help supply merchandise and show considerable profits due to the war boom 32 . Indeed the I.G. success of this multi-optional network of production and supply was stunning: In Latin America it generated more profit during the war than before the outbreak of the conflict 33 . Due to increasing prices, 1941 promised to earn a five year record high in profits.
All of this changed after the German attack on Russia. The Transsiberian transit was closed, U.S. and Latin American efforts made an end to Axis airlines in South America and the Pacific became an active war zone after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The final blow to I.G. Farben's multinational network in the Western Hemisphere came when the U.S. enacted the Proclaimed Lists (Black List) in the summer of 1941. Overnight it cut off Latin American subsidiaries from the remaining supply sources in the U.S. What was worse was that the Latin American countries followed U.S. policies and confiscated Axis property in their own countries. Mexico put all German property under Mexican management.
Here then begins a new chapter of Mexico's struggle over technical know-how. Although the Mexican government had gladly complied with the U.S. demands to make an end to German controlled companies in Mexico, it did not follow suggestions to destroy the I.G. Farben complex or auctioned off its patents on the free market. Rather, the Mexican state took over patents and licenses and "mexicanized" I.G. Farben's subsidiaries. Thus the I.G. continued to exist but under Mexican control and management 34 . By accident, due to the historical situation, the Mexican government had gained control over a vital industrial sector in its country's future without having to confront the German multinational openly. The Second World War allowed Ávila Camacho's government to kill two birds with one stone: it affirmed her commitment to Hemispheric cooperation by following U.S. Proclaimed Lists procedures, and at the
